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Abstract
Th is paper examines the role of one powerful business owner in local government 
decision-making. Th e paper examines Manuel Moroun’s eff orts to infl uence local 
government decision-making in Windsor, Ontario. Moroun is the owner of the 
Ambassador Bridge (the most signifi cant North American border crossing in terms 
of the volume and value of trade), which connects the cities of Windsor and Detroit. 
Moroun is currently engaged in an eff ort to build a replacement bridge and prevent 
the construction of a publicly-controlled bridge that will break the monopoly that 
his bridge currently enjoys. In this campaign Moroun has sought to infl uence local 
governments. Th is paper examines these eff orts and the degree of their success in 
infl uencing the decisions taken by Windsor City Council with respect to the border 
crossing. Th e paper examines diff erent explanations of Moroun’s infl uence in local 
politics. Th e conclusions reached are that Moroun is a major player in local politics. 
He has not however dominated local decision-making and has not enjoyed as much 
infl uence as in the United States. Windsor City Council has been prepared to oppose 
his policy goals and have been at least partially successful in these eff orts.
Keywords: municipal government, big business, border crossing, urban regimes 
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Résumé
Cet article examine le rôle d’un chef d’entreprise puissant dans le processus décisionnel 
du gouvernement local. L’article examine les eff orts de Manuel Moroun à infl uencer 
le processus décisionnel du gouvernement local de Windsor, Ontario. Moroun est le 
propriétaire du pont Ambassador (le poste frontière le plus signifi catif en Amérique 
du Nord en termes de volume et valeur d’échange), qui relie les villes de Windsor et 
Detroit. Actuellement, Moroun est engagé dans un eff ort pour construire un pont de 
remplacement et empêcher la construction d’un pont de rechange sous contrôle public 
qui rompra le monopole dont son pont bénéfi cie actuellement. Dans cette campagne, 
Moroun a cherché d’infl uencer les gouvernements locaux. Cet article examine ces 
eff orts et le degré de succès de leur infl uence sur les décisions prises par le conseil 
municipal de Windsor par rapport au poste frontière. L’article examine les diff érentes 
explications de l’infl uence de Moroun dans la politique locale. Les conclusions atteintes 
sont que Moroun est un acteur majeur dans la politique locale. Cependant, il n’a pas, 
dominé la prise de décision locale et n’a pas eu autant d’infl uence qu’aux Etats-Unis. 
Le conseil municipal de Windsor a été préparé pour s’opposer à ses objectifs politiques 
et a du moins partiellement réussi. 
Mots clés: gouvernement municipal, grandes entreprises, poste frontière, régimes 
urbains 
Introduction
Scholars of municipal politics in Canada and elsewhere have long studied the 
infl uence of major business interests, fi nancial organizations and property developers 
on municipal decision-making (Cobban 2003; Peterson 1981; Leo 1997; 2003; Stone 
1989; 1993). A central question in this scholarship is whether these actors infl uence 
the local democratic process and thus secure advantageous regulatory or development 
decisions that are not necessarily in the interests of the wider local community. Th is 
question is given added urgency, it is often argued, by the mobility of modern capital 
and business in an era of globalization and by recent economic conditions that have 
created or added to fi scal problems facing municipal governments (Hackworth 2007; 
Leo 2002; McAllister 2004; Ruppert 2000).
Th is paper examines this question by analyzing a case study involving a fi nancially 
powerful business and property owner and his eff orts to infl uence development 
decisions within Windsor in Ontario, Canada. Th e businessman in question is Manuel 
(Matty) Moroun who, although a resident of Michigan, controls a business empire 
that extends into Canada. Th e most signifi cant, if not the most profi table, element of 
this empire is the Ambassador Bridge that links Windsor with Detroit and which is a 
central element facilitating the fl ow of North American trade. In addition, Moroun’s 
companies have signifi cant land holdings in both Michigan and in Windsor. 
Over the past decade, Matty Moroun has sought to construct a new span and plaza 
on properties he owns immediately to the west of the existing Ambassador Bridge (the 
so-called twinning or enhancement of the Ambassador Bridge). Th is is a complicated 
development proposal that requires approval from a wide range of actors on both 
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sides of the border (Sutcliff e 2008; 2011; 2012). Th e municipal government does not 
have unilateral control over these policy decisions and Matty Moroun’s attempt to 
infl uence the border policy debate is by no means restricted to the municipal level. 
Th is case nevertheless presents an opportunity to examine one individual’s attempts 
to infl uence a Canadian municipal government because the proposed twinning of the 
Ambassador Bridge requires that Matty Moroun deal with Windsor City Council. 
In this relationship, Matty Moroun has employed several strategies, including legal 
cases and public campaigns, in order to infl uence the municipal council’s position. Th is 
article examines these attempts and their impact.
Business Interests and Canadian Municipalities
Th e recognition that business interests (along with property developers, and commercial 
and fi nancial elites) have the potential to shape municipal decision-making is not new 
and has long been the subject of academic examination in multiple settings (Cobban, 
2003; Dahl 1961; Hackworth 2007; Savitch and Kantor 2002; Leo 1997; 2002; Stone 
1989; 1993). It is also one that generates controversy.
According to one perspective, business interests enjoy a dominant place in local 
policy-making because of the fi nancial resources they control and because of their 
economic importance to the local community as well as municipal governments’ 
traditional responsibility for providing services to residential and commercial properties. 
Municipal politicians recognize the importance of business interests’ capacity to shape 
local economic development and therefore their importance to the economic vitality 
of a local community. In addition, municipal politicians recognize the possibility that 
business interests may relocate to an alternative location and thus withdraw their 
resources from the local tax base (Peterson 1981; see also Cobban 2003: 233; Harding, 
Wilks-Heeg, and Hutchins 2000).1 Th is account of urban politics highlights the 
dominant position enjoyed by these business and development interests within the local 
community, and the extent to which elected politicians feel obliged to develop policies 
that refl ect their interests (such as lower business taxes and development costs), at the 
expense of investing money in tackling other issues such as social exclusion or urban 
poverty (see Sellers 2002; Leo 2003). Th ese arguments have increasingly been linked 
to the prevalence of neoliberalism as a philosophy dominating politics at diff erent 
territorial levels over the last two to three decades (Harvey 2005; Hackworth 2007). 
Neoliberalism emphasises that government regulation and intervention should only 
occur sparingly and that instead individuals and businesses should operate “within an 
institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade. Th e role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices” (Harvey 2005: 2). In the view of some scholars, this 
governing perspective has aff ected municipal governments by placing substantial limits 
on their decision-making capacity, particularly as it relates to powerful business interests 
(see Tindal and Tindal 2009: 18-19; Hackworth 2007). Ruppert’s study of Toronto, for 
example, argues that private business interests increasingly dominate governance of the 
city and, as a result, local government is a “shell emptied of its content” (2000: 285).
A related view, building on the work of Clarence Stone, argues that municipalities 
can be dominated by an alliance between business (particularly local developers) and 
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elected offi  cials in an ‘urban regime’ (Stone 1989; 1993). An urban regime points to 
the existence of a stable relationship forming among actors at the municipal level that 
allows them to pursue mutually advantageous policy goals (Leo, 1995). A ‘corporate 
regime’ linking business interests and politicians is one possible example of such a 
regime with the actors possessing a shared interest in an urban policy agenda that 
favours business and development. While disagreement exists regarding the existence 
of urban regimes in Canadian settings (Cobban 2003; Leo 2003), this disagreement 
focuses on the stability and permanence of relationships at the urban level. Th ere is a 
much wider agreement that diff erent business interests can be infl uential at diff erent 
times in municipal policy-making (Rayside 1991). As noted above, the reasons for 
this can relate to the capacity of business groups to shape the municipal economy. In 
addition, it may result from their access to municipal decision-makers or from their 
ability to contribute to municipal politicians’ election campaign funds.
Mega-projects, such as the construction of major league sports stadiums or other 
major infrastructure projects, are sometimes used as an example of the pervasiveness 
of business interests as an infl uence on municipal governments. In this view, mega-
projects are promoted by municipal governments, in part because of the pressure to 
develop the ‘world class’ reputation of the municipality and thus make it desirable 
to mobile businesses, capital and investors (see Sassen 2001; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, 
and Rodriguez 2002). Swyngedouw et al. conclude that mega-projects contribute to 
situations where cities “hide in their underbelly perverse and pervasive processes of 
social exclusion and marginalization and are rife with all manner of struggle, confl ict, 
and often outright despair in the midst of the greatest affl  uence, abundance, and 
pleasure” (2002: 545; see also Hackworth 2007: 170-1).
Th ere are, then, a number of scholars who emphasize the relative powerlessness of 
municipal governments in the face of major business interests and property developers. 
Th ere are also, however, more nuanced views. Savitch and Kantor, for example, 
conclude that cities “have real alternatives in coping with the eff ects of globalization” 
when it comes to promoting development strategies (2003: 1003). Jack Hackworth 
likewise argues that while all municipal governments have faced pressures to conform 
to a neoliberal policy agenda, not all municipalities have responded in the same way 
(Hackworth 2007; see also Stahre 2004; Massey 2007; Sutcliff e 2011). Starting 
from a slightly diff erent focus, Hamel identifi es the potential emergence of an urban 
citizenship that “favours the use of individual and collective action to bring social and 
cultural concerns into public-political space, such as greater social justice, heritage 
preservation, or the promotion of local democracy” (Hamel 2005: 38; Magnussun 
2005). Th ere is also a long history of community mobilization and opposition to 
projects (often mega-projects) promoted by municipal governments and developers. 
Jane Jacobs, in part, became well-known for her opposition to road construction and 
urban redevelopment in New York and Toronto (Leo 1977; Paul 2005). In addition 
to community opposition to developers or business proposals, it is also important to 
appreciate that business owners are not inevitably unifi ed actors with shared interests. 
Instead, it is entirely possible that these actors have distinct and confl icting views about 
specifi c municipal policies and proposals.
Studying the infl uence of business interests in decision-making within Canadian 
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municipalities therefore requires an examination of diff erent case studies with particular 
attention to the context, actors and potential idiosyncrasies of each case (Leo 2003). 
Th is analysis of the City of Windsor’s reaction to the Ambassador Bridge Company’s 
proposal to build a second Detroit River border crossing, as well as the interaction 
between the company and the city, is one such case study.
 
Th e Detroit River Border Crossing
Th e construction of a new bridge spanning the Detroit River linking Windsor, Ontario 
and Detroit, Michigan has been under debate for over a decade. Th e impetus to construct 
a new crossing results from the fact that this is the busiest Canada-U.S. border crossing 
in terms of commercial traffi  c, particularly truck trade (Bow 2009; Brunet-Jailly 2000; 
2006). In 2010 bilateral trade in goods and services between Canada and the United 
States was approximately $645 billion, with over $1.7 billion worth of goods and 
services crossing the border each day (Government of Canada 2012). Approximately 
30 per cent of the total trade in goods crosses the border in south-west Ontario with 
the majority carried by trucks crossing the Ambassador Bridge over the Detroit River 
(see Pastor 2011; Sutcliff e 2012; Anderson 2012).
Th e approximately three million trucks that use the Ambassador Bridge each 
year make this the single most signifi cant part of the North American transportation 
network (Austin, Dzenski, and Aff olter-Caine 2008; Alden, 2008). Several reasons 
have been advanced to support the construction of a new border crossing to replace 
the Ambassador Bridge. Th e fi rst of these relates to the age of the Ambassador Bridge, 
which was completed in 1929 (Mason 1987). As such, the bridge is nearing the end of 
its life-expectancy without substantial repairs (Battagello 2009a). 
A second reason relates to border traffi  c projections and questions about the 
continued capacity of the four-lane Ambassador Bridge to support the bilateral trade 
fl ow across the Detroit River border. Th e bridge was completed before the signifi cant 
expansion in U.S.-Canadian trade through the latter decades of the twentieth century 
and before the development of the modern multi-wheel trucks that carry much of this 
trade. Both the governments concerned and the Ambassador Bridge Company indicate 
that extra capacity will eventually be required to supplement or replace the existing 
bridge. Various government reports indicate that the expansion of trade justifi es the 
construction of a second bridge (Detroit River International Crossing Partnership 
2009). Government trade projections have been reduced over time, in part refl ecting 
changing economic conditions following the post-2008 recession. Nevertheless, the 
governments continue to assert that the traffi  c projections show that the existing border 
crossings will be at or over capacity between 2015 and 2025 (Michigan Department of 
Transportation 2010; see also Battagello 2010a).
Security is a third reason given to justify the construction of a new Detroit 
River border crossing. According to this argument, the economic importance of the 
Ambassador Bridge, combined with the example of the costly border delays in the 
immediate aftermath of the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, demands that a 
second bridge be constructed. In this view, a second bridge provides extra border 
crossing capacity that will be essential in the event that the Ambassador Bridge is 
closed as a result of a terrorist incident or signifi cant accident (see Canadian Senate 
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2005; Austin, Dzenski, and Aff olter-Caine 2008).
Th ere is, therefore, a widespread consensus within both the public and private 
sectors supporting the construction of a new Detroit River border crossing ( Jang, 
Marotte, and Keenan 2011; Keenan 2007; Austin, Dzenski, and Aff olter-Caine 2008). 
Th ere is not, however, unanimous agreement on where this crossing should be located, 
who should pay for, build and operate it. Th ese questions continue to generate debate and 
disagreement more than a decade after they were fi rst raised. While various actors have 
advanced diff erent proposals for a new crossing over this time, only two have advanced 
beyond the preliminary stage of development. One of these is the Ambassador Bridge 
Company’s proposal to construct a replacement span.2 Th e company fi rst submitted 
its proposal for an Ambassador Bridge Enhancement Project in 2006, with additional 
information being submitted in subsequent years (Transport Canada 2013; Battagello 
2011a). Th is proposal to construct a six-lane, cable-stayed bridge that will connect 
the existing bridge plaza in Detroit to an expanded plaza in Windsor is currently 
undergoing an environmental assessment process by the Canadian federal government 
(see Transport Canada 2013; Battagello 2013a; Jarvis 2013a). It will, in addition, 
require environmental approval from the U.S. federal government, with the U.S. Coast 
Guard being the lead agency in this process, as well as a presidential permit (Chen 
2009). As of June 2014, these approvals and permits have not been secured.
Th e second proposal is for a publicly-owned but privately-constructed and run 
bridge; the so-called Detroit River International Crossing (DRIC).3 Th is proposal 
was developed by a bi-national partnership of representatives from the four senior 
governments—the governments of Ontario and Michigan and the two federal 
governments—that need to provide formal approval for a new border crossing. It has 
been discussed at summit meetings between Prime Minister Stephen Harper and 
President Barack Obama, as well as at meetings of federal government representatives 
and those of the state and provincial governments. By 2009 it had secured the required 
environmental approvals in both the United States and Canada (Nelles and Sutcliff e 
2013). Th e Canadian government introduced and passed the 2012 Bridge to Strengthen 
Trade Act to provide the Canadian federal legislative approval for the construction of a 
new bridge, and in June 2012 signed an agreement with the Government of Michigan 
to provide a $550 million loan to cover Michigan’s share of the construction costs 
( Jang, 2012; Chase and Keenan, 2012). A U.S. presidential permit was submitted in 
June 2012 and approved on 12 April 2013 (Battagello 2013b; Chase 2013), and a 
Coast Guard permit for the proposed bridge was granted on 3 June 2014 (Battagello 
2014a). In addition, the land for the bridge has been purchased on the Canadian 
side and the fi rst call for tenders from private companies interested in participating 
in the construction and running of the bridge were issued by the Canadian federal 
government in June 2014 (Battagello 2014b).
Matty Moroun and the Ambassador Bridge
A central player in the debate over the future of the Detroit River border is the 
businessman who owns the Ambassador Bridge. Manuel “Matty” Moroun was born 
in 1927 (the same year as construction of the Ambassador Bridge began), grew up 
in Detroit and currently resides in Grosse Point Shores, a suburb of Detroit (Kidd 
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2005; McKenna 2010). His family’s net worth is listed at U.S. $1.1 billion by Forbes 
magazine as of March 2013 (Manuel Moroun & Family 2013) and he controls a wide 
range of enterprises including trucking companies, insurance and property holdings 
(Battagello 2006a; 2009b). In 1979 the Moroun family’s Central Cartage Company 
purchased the fi nal shares that secured outright ownership of the Ambassador Bridge, 
and they have controlled the bridge since that time under the joint title of the Detroit 
International Bridge Company and the Canadian Transit Company (Fitch and Muller 
2004; Jang 2007).
Th e Ambassador Bridge, which was originally constructed by a private consortium 
and which has always been privately owned, has increased in economic importance to 
Matty Moroun as the volume of traffi  c across the bridge has increased since 1979. It is 
variously estimated that the company annually secures approximately US$60 million 
in tolls from the bridge (Sorensen 2011; Kidd 2005). In addition, the bridge company 
owns the duty free stores and gas stations connected to the bridge (Vander Doelen 
2012a). Although the exact fi gures are not publicly known, the Ambassador Bridge’s 
total value to Matty Moroun is evident from the length to which he has gone in 
order to retain a virtual monopoly of the truck traffi  c across the Detroit River border 
crossing. Th is involves lawsuits brought against various governments in the United 
States and Canada (Battagello 2013c), including a case brought under NAFTA 
against the Canadian government (Battagello 2010b). In 2010 the Ambassador Bridge 
Company sought an injunction in U.S. federal court to prevent the construction of a 
government-backed bridge across the Detroit River. In this suit, the company claimed 
that the U.S. and Canadian governments were conspiring to undermine the value of 
the Ambassador Bridge and force him out of business (Battagello 2010c).
Moroun has worked extensively within Michigan in order to block the 
authorization of a government-owned rival to the Ambassador Bridge. Th is takes the 
form of lobbying members of the Michigan legislature, including through the provision 
of campaign donations and advertising, in order to block approval of a rival bridge 
(Battagello 2012a; Christoff  and Gray 2011; Fantoni 2012). Although it is diffi  cult to 
establish whether this lobbying infl uenced Michigan politicians’ decision-making with 
respect to a new bridge, it is the case that a bill to authorize Michigan’s participation in 
the construction of the DRIC bridge was held up in committee within the Michigan 
Senate (Lessenberry 2012; Spangler 2010; White 2011). Th is lengthy delay led 
Michigan Governor Rick Snyder to bypass the legislature and sign an international 
agreement with the government of Canada in June 2012 authorizing construction 
of the Detroit River International Crossing bridge ( Jang 2012; Chase and Keenan 
2012; Th ey aren’t building that 2012). Matty Moroun, in turn, sought to overturn this 
international agreement by sponsoring and securing the inclusion of Proposal 6 on 
the November 2012 Michigan ballot. Th is initiative was intended to require a state 
referendum in order to approve construction of a new international crossing (Chen 
2012; Chase 2012; Gallagher 2012). Th e Moroun family spent approximately US$30 
million on advertising in a failed eff ort to secure a ‘yes’ vote on this proposal (Battagello 
2012b; 2012c; Egan and Gallagher 2012).
At the same time as Matty Moroun has sought to block the construction of 
the DRIC bridge, he is also working to construct his own replacement. As noted 
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above, the Ambassador Bridge Enhancement Project is currently undergoing an 
environmental assessment as one of the required steps before it can proceed. In 
addition, Moroun’s companies have purchased considerable amounts of property in 
both Michigan and Windsor to further the aim of building a twin span. Specifi cally 
with respect to Windsor, the company has purchased approximately 140 houses in 
the Sandwich area of the city which will be required to be demolished if the bridge 
company is able to move forward with its enhancement plan (Battagello 2007a). 
Th ese purchases, as part of the larger enhancement project, mean that the bridge 
company is drawn into a relationship with Windsor City Council (Battagello 2009c; 
Jarvis 2009; Sutcliff e 2011). 
Th e City of Windsor and the Ambassador Bridge Company
Th e City of Windsor does not have formal decision-making authority over the choice 
of border crossing location or responsibility for paying for a new bridge or related 
border infrastructure. It is, however, intensely aff ected by the border and decisions 
relating to its future. In the fi rst place, the City is Windsor has been the co-owner of 
the Windsor-Detroit tunnel since the 1990s. Th e tunnel is an important part of the 
Detroit River border infrastructure but it is, for the most part, not in direct competition 
with either the Ambassador Bridge or a new bridge as only a very limited number of 
trucks are permitted to use the tunnel. Th e city’s interest in the border also stems 
from the extent to which the city’s economic vitality is dependent upon cross-border 
trade and particularly trade relating to the highly integrated automotive sector with 
its manufacturing plants and suppliers in Windsor and Michigan. It also follows from 
the location of the Ambassador Bridge and the fact that the bridge and its access roads 
run through the city.
When Highway 401 was extended to south-western Ontario in the 1950s 
it was not linked to the Ambassador Bridge (Sutcliff e 2012). As a result, the fi nal 
approximately 16 kilometres of the route to the bridge are city streets, and trucks 
carrying international trade must intersect with local traffi  c and negotiate 17 stop 
lights before reaching the border and subsequently entering the U.S. interstate highway 
system. In addition, the existing Canadian bridge plaza is too small to accommodate 
all of the demands placed upon it. Trucks that are requested to stop for more detailed 
secondary inspection when entering Canada, for example, cannot be accommodated 
at the existing plaza but instead have to drive to a location removed from the border 
(Battagello 2005a).
Truck traffi  c heading to and from the Ambassador Bridge therefore has a signifi cant 
impact on Windsor. As a result, Windsor City Council is an active participant in the 
policy debates surrounding the reform of the Detroit River border crossing. Its central 
position has remained consistent over the course of the border debate. Th e city argues 
that a new border crossing must be as far removed from the city’s core as possible and 
should be located in the western, industrial edge of the city (Sutcliff e 2008). Th is was 
the central conclusion of the city’s 2005 Schwartz Report (Battagello 2007b), and it 
also led the city to support the location of the proposed Detroit River International 
Crossing bridge (Detroit River International Crossing Partnership 2009). When the 
binational government partnership team released its recommended bridge location, 
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Windsor Mayor Eddie Francis stated that this location is exactly what city council 
“has been advocating for from Day 1…Th e plaza and crossing are exactly where we 
would like it to be” (quoted in Battagello 2008a). 
Windsor City Council has therefore been a vocal advocate of the proposed DRIC 
bridge. Its support for this project includes lobbying within the United States in an 
eff ort to secure the support of the Michigan legislature and public for this project 
(see Nelles and Sutcliff e 2013; Greenwood 2008). Th e city’s support for the proposed 
DRIC bridge is also related to its opposition to the Ambassador Bridge Company’s 
enhancement project. Although the city council advocates that additional border 
crossing capacity will be advantageous for the city, it has also consistently argued that 
the extra capacity should not take the shape of a second span as proposed by the 
Ambassador Bridge company. Th e city has advanced two main arguments against this 
project. First, it argues that the proposed twin span and its plaza will have a negative 
impact on the Sandwich area of the city where it is located and will further divide this 
community from the rest of the city. Secondly, the city argues that the highway access 
route for an Ambassador Bridge Enhancement Project will continue to divide the city, 
intersect with city streets and have negative environmental consequences for residents 
(Fessler 2007; Battagello 2006b; Sutcliff e 2012). In his 2008 state of the city address, 
Mayor Eddie Francis expressed this sentiment when stating that, “Our citizens deserve 
a better quality of life, a healthier environment and a solution that gets trucks off  of city 
streets and out of our neighbourhoods” (Francis 2008).
In sum, the city’s central goal in the border crossing debates is to advocate for a 
new border crossing that is further removed from the city and which thus routes cross-
border traffi  c, and especially trucks, away from city streets. With this in mind, the city 
opposes a second Ambassador Bridge span and supports construction of the DRIC 
bridge. Th ese positions have brought the city into confl ict with the Ambassador Bridge 
company, particularly with respect to the company’s extensive property holdings in 
Windsor. As noted above, the company has purchased over 140 houses in the Sandwich 
area of the city and is currently seeking to demolish many of these properties in order 
to clear the land needed for its enhancement project (Battagello 2007a). Th ese houses, 
which have been largely left vacant and boarded up, bring signifi cant problems to 
the community. Th ey have become the scenes of drug abuse and vandalism, they 
provide a breeding ground for vermin, and they are distinctly problematic for house 
owners in the immediate vicinity. Overall, they are highly damaging to Sandwich’s 
image and thus its reputation and make it highly unlikely that people will be willing 
to locate in Sandwich (Schmidt 2009). In spite of this, the city continues to oppose 
the demolition of these houses. In January 2007 the city passed a demolition control 
by-law to prevent these houses being taken down (Danese 2007). Related to this, the 
city initiated a Sandwich Heritage Conservation District study in September 2006, 
which ultimately led to the preparation of Th e Sandwich Heritage Conservation District 
Conservation Plan in July 2008 (City of Windsor 2008). Th e city claims that Sandwich, 
including many of the properties owned by the Ambassador Bridge, has heritage value 
and therefore that properties within the heritage area can only be demolished if certain 
conditions are met, including the full disclosure of the company’s plans for the area 
(City of Windsor 2008: 4.6). In the words of Mayor Eddie Francis: “Historical and 
Canadian Journal of Urban Research / Revue canadienne de recherche urbaine
CJUR Summer 23:1 201464
cultural preservation is not something new. ...It is very signifi cant in our city to have 
the historical signifi cance of an area like Sandwich. We are looking to preserve that” 
(Battagello 2007a). 
Th ere is a large extent to which the heritage designation and the demolition by-
law controls are deliberately targeted against the bridge company’s plan to build a 
second span. Th e mayor, for example, has asserted that the council is “not prepared to 
cede a large swath of Sandwich for a [new] customs plaza” (quoted in Schmidt 2012a). 
Certainly the company claims that the city’s actions target the Ambassador Bridge 
Company. Th e company fi led a lawsuit in July 2010 against the mayor and councillors 
claiming that they deliberately sought to interfere with the bridge’s business and 
prevent the construction of a new crossing (Schmidt 2010). It is also the case that in 
September 2008 Greg Heil, then chair of Windsor’s Heritage Committee, resigned 
claiming that there were political infl uences placed on the committee by the council 
in reaching its conclusions (Lajoie 2008). Th is is also the view of one local landowners’ 
group called Boarded Up Houses Demolition Action Group, led by Hilary Payne who 
has owned houses in Sandwich for over 20 years. As the name implies, this group seeks 
the demolition of the Ambassador Bridge’s houses in Sandwich on the grounds that 
they negatively aff ect property values in the area. Th ey also argue that the bridge has 
provided a suitable plan for landscaping the land left if the houses are demolished. 
Th is group joined the bridge company’s lawsuit against the city to have the demolition 
control by-laws overturned. One interesting aspect of this case is that Hilary Payne 
successfully secured election to city council in 2010 and was therefore in the rather 
unusual situation of being a sitting councillor suing the council of which he is a part 
(Battagello 2011b).
It is the case, therefore, that while Moroun is a rich and powerful businessman and 
property owner, he has not been able to secure the support he wants from Windsor City 
Council in the debate over the border crossing. Th e city does not support the bridge 
company’s goal of building a second bridge and has not permitted the demolition of 
the houses the company owns in order to clear the way for this span. Nor has Moroun 
won his legal case against the city. In September 2011 an Ontario Superior Court ruled 
in favour of the city and against the bridge company and the local landowners’ group 
(Chen 2011; Vander Doelen 2011). After initially launching an appeal of this ruling, 
the company and group dropped their case in August 2012 and paid damages of over 
$1 million to the city (see Schmidt 2012a; 2012b; 2012c; Vander Doelen 2012b).  Th e 
company has not, however, abandoned its plan to demolish these houses (Brownell 
2012), or to construct a second crossing.
Th ere are several reasons that explain Moroun’s apparent lack of infl uence over 
Windsor City Council. Th e fi rst relates to municipal campaign fi nance laws in Ontario 
(Cobban 2003). Although there are several sources that point to evidence of Moroun’s 
fi nancial infl uence within Windsor (see Schmidt 2012a; Jarvis 2013b),4 the Ontario 
Municipal Act place a $750 limit on the amount that an individual or business can 
donate to a municipal candidate and a total maximum of $5,000 that can be given in 
one municipal jurisdiction. Windsor Mayor Eddie Francis’ fi nancial report indicates 
that none of Moroun’s Canadian companies or family donated to the mayor’s 2010 
election campaign. A sample of elected councillors and defeated candidates also fails 
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to turn up evidence of donations by Moroun. Th is limited or non-existent fi nancial 
impact on the Windsor municipal elections stands in stark contrast to the amounts 
that Moroun and his family and companies have donated to politicians at the state and 
local levels in Michigan. In the 2009-2010 Michigan election cycle, which include the 
gubernational election, Moroun’s family and businesses donated over US$1.5 million 
to Michigan state and congressional candidates (Christoff  and Gray 2011; Battagello 
2010d; Lessenberry 2010). Moroun’s donations to politicians’ election campaigns are 
in addition to the money spent on independent advertising with respect to the border 
debate (Battagello 2011c), including over US$30 million spent on the 2012 Proposal 
6 campaign (Egan and Gallagher 2012).
Moroun also donates heavily to politicians at the municipal level in Michigan, 
including Detroit. Signifi cantly, for example, Moroun donated to the scandal-ridden 
Kwame Kilpatrick, who was Mayor of Detroit between 2001 and 2008, and had 
frequent meetings with the mayor (Battagello 2008b; Nelles and Sutcliff e 2013). While 
it is impossible to prove conclusively that these donations swayed Kilpatrick’s political 
opinions, it is the case that he opposed the Detroit River International Crossing 
project and advocated in favour of twinning the Ambassador Bridge (Henion 2007). 
More recently a member of the Michigan House of Representatives, Fred Durhal, 
who unsuccessfully ran for Mayor of Detroit in 2013, launched a lawsuit against the 
DRIC crossing arguing that the Michigan Governor had no right to sign a deal with 
the Canadian government without the Michigan legislature’s consent. Durhal received 
several thousands in campaign contributions from the Moroun family (Battagello 
2013d; Jarvis 2013c). In spite of these examples, it is important to note that Moroun 
has not consistently secured the unanimous support of Detroit City Council for his 
Ambassador Bridge Enhancement Project or its opposition to the DRIC bridge 
(Nelles and Sutcliff e 2013).
Ontario’s Municipal Act therefore prevents Moroun from making campaign 
donations in an attempt to infl uence Windsor’s municipal decision-making on the 
scale evident in Michigan. A second factor that helps to explain Moroun’s relative 
lack of infl uence is the extensive community opposition to the Ambassador Bridge 
Company’s Enhancement Project within Windsor, and particularly within the 
Sandwich community, where there is vocal opposition to any prospect of a new 
crossing being built in the location of the existing Ambassador Bridge. In 2005, 
for example, Hildegard Ashe (then executive director of the Sandwich Community 
Health Centre and chair of the Sandwich Towne development corporation) stated 
that if the “goal is to facilitate trade at the expense of the people in Sandwich…this 
community is not going to stand idly by and let it happen…” (Battagello 2005b). Th is 
absolute opposition to the Ambassador Bridge Enhancement Project is echoed by 
a number of local residents and business owners (interviews with author). In these 
views the company has “not provided a penny” towards the community and rather 
seems intent on devastating the community through the loss of housing stock and the 
damage being caused to the neighbourhood’s reputation. One local business owner, 
Mary Ann Cuderman, is frequently vocal in her criticism of Matty Moroun. In one 
such comment, she asserted that Matty Moroun “has decimated a whole community 
and made us look like a ghetto on his own whim” (quoted in Battagello 2008c).
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While it is not the case that the entire city, or even the whole of the Sandwich 
community, is opposed to the Ambassador Bridge’s proposal (as is evidenced by the 
Boarded Up Homes Action Group noted above), community consultation data as well 
as election results indicate that the majority of the community are opposed (Detroit 
River International Crossing Partnership 2008: 15). Th e city council, including the 
councillor representing the Sandwich community, Mayor Eddie Francis and the major 
city newspaper, Th e Windsor Star, all oppose the Ambassador Bridge Company (see, for 
example, Land freeze 2008; New bridge 2012). Th ere is, then, a correlation between 
popular opinion and the positions adopted by city council and the mayor and both run 
counter to the goals of the Ambassador Bridge Company.
A third factor explaining the relative inability of Matty Moroun to infl uence 
Windsor City Council is the fact that the majority of his companies are located in 
Michigan and not Ontario. Studies of neoliberalism in urban settings indicate that it is 
the threat of relocation that is a central reason why business and commercial interests 
are able to infl uence municipal councils (Tindal and Tindal 2009; Ruppert 2000). In 
this case study, because the overwhelming majority of Moroun’s business interests are 
based in the United States, the threat of relocation carries little weight for the Windsor 
City Council. Moreover, the Canadian Transit Company, the holding company for 
the Canadian half of the Ambassador Bridge, cannot, by its very nature, be relocated. 
It is also not possible for Moroun to threaten to allow the existing bridge to become 
inoperable as this would be counter to his own interests and also add further weight to 
the arguments in favour of a publicly-owned crossing.
It is also diffi  cult to argue that Matty Moroun is able to exercise the type of 
infl uence that is sometimes ascribed to property developers in Canada and elsewhere 
(Leo 1995; 1997). In this case, although the bridge company is a major property owner 
in Windsor, it is not a traditional property developer in so far as its objective is to 
remove the properties and clear the land for a mega-project (in this case a new bridge) 
rather than to build a new housing or commercial development or redevelop existing 
residential or commercial property. In the event that it does proceed, the Ambassador 
Bridge Enhancement Project will not add to the city’s tax base in a manner that is 
commensurate with a new subdivision or redeveloped commercial district. It is in part 
for this reason that the bridge company has not secured vocal support from other major 
fi nancial and business interests in Windsor. It is certainly not the case that municipal 
politicians, the bridge company and other business interests are part of a stable and 
secure governing relationship as described by Clarence Stone in his analysis of urban 
regimes (Stone 1993: 9). Instead, the relationship has been divisive, as made apparent 
in the mayor’s frequent critical public statements about the bridge and in the bridge’s 
failed legal suit against the city (Chen 2011; Vander Doelen 2011; Schmidt 2012b). 
Th ey remain divided about the future of these properties and the area in general, with 
the city maintaining its opposition to a second Ambassador Bridge (see Brownell 
2012; Schmidt 2012c).
Th e fact that the Ambassador Bridge Company is proposing a mega-project 
has not helped the company infl uence the municipal council. As noted above, mega-
projects are sometimes promoted by municipal councils because they can help to build 
the municipality’s reputation as a world class destination in the eyes of investors and 
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businesses (see Sassen 2001; Swyngedouw, Moulaert, and Rodriguez 2002). In this case, 
the city does support the construction of a new bridge and is therefore in line with the 
major business interests that also demand a new crossing to facilitate their operations. 
Th e city is not challenging the premise that a new crossing is central to the integration 
of the North American economy, and particularly the automotive sector. Th e city does 
support Windsor’s position as a trade hub in the North American economy (Sutcliff e 
2011). Th is does not, however, strengthen the position of the Ambassador Bridge 
Company. A viable alternative to the Ambassador Bridge’s proposal exists in the form 
of the Detroit River International Crossing. Th e city is therefore not dependent upon 
Matty Moroun to provide the new border crossing that will facilitate the movement 
of trade.
Conclusion
Matty Moroun is an important fi gure in the economics and politics of the Detroit 
River border crossing. His importance stems from his ownership of the Ambassador 
Bridge, which is the single most signifi cant North American border crossing, his 
proposal to construct a second bridge, as well as his ownership of properties and land. 
It is certainly the case that newspaper and popular perception assign Moroun a pivotal 
role in the future of the border (Th ey aren’t building that 2012; Fitch and Muller 2004; 
Jang 2007; Kidd 2005).
Matty Moroun is intent on maintaining control of this vital component in the 
regional and North American economy for as long as possible and has already spent 
many millions of dollars in advertising, campaign donations, legal fees and property 
acquisitions in the attempt to secure this objective. Moroun’s infl uence over the local 
Canadian municipal government (and indeed the senior Canadian governments), 
has however been limited. Owning signifi cant business interests and properties in 
the Canadian municipality has not translated into policy infl uence. Th e municipal 
government is opposed to Moroun’s goal of building a new bridge and has used by-
laws, its powers with respect to heritage designation, and lobbying senior governments 
to advance this opposition. Moroun has not been able to use the legal system to reverse 
this municipal opposition. In short, there is no shared interest between the municipal 
government and Matty Moroun and certainly no stable network of infl uence with 
respect to the border.
Th e situation in Canada, to some extent, stands in contrast to the United States 
where Moroun has been able to secure some support at the state and municipal 
levels (though by no means complete support). Th e case study therefore points to the 
importance of the regulatory setting in any examination of the interaction between 
business interests and a municipal government. In this case, the crucial diff erences 
between the United States and Canada are the considerable diff erence in the quantity 
of campaign contributions allowed in the former as compared to the latter, and the 
extent to which Moroun’s business interests are located within Michigan rather than 
Ontario. It is also important to recognize the importance of community opinion in 
this case and consequently the democratic impulse. Windsor City Council has both 
responded to and led the local community in its opposition to Matty Moroun’s 
Ambassdor Bridge Enhancement Project.
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Matty Moroun does not dominate municipal policy-making in Windsor. At the 
same time, his importance cannot be completely downplayed. He has been able to 
create roadblocks to the construction of a publicly-owned bridge that will rival his 
own. He has acquired a considerable property portfolio with a negative impact on the 
local community. Finally, he continues to push for the construction of his own new 
bridge. At the time of writing, there is no guarantee that he will not succeed despite 
municipal opposition.
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Notes
1 A recent example of this occurred in Calgary in April 2013. A video released to the 
media contained footage of a Calgary developer claiming to be able to exert infl uence 
over city council (Walton 2013).
2 Th e bridge is owned and operated by two companies—the Detroit International 
Bridge Company and the Canadian Transit Company—but both are owned by Man-
uel (Matty) Moroun who secured ownership of the bridge in 1979. Th e Ambassador 
Bridge Company is used here as a convenient short-form.
3 Th is proposal is also sometimes referred to as the New International Trade Crossing.
4 It is, for example, frequently suggested that Matty Moroun provides fi nancial back-
ing to Ed Arditti who is a prominent local blogger and activist ( Jarvis 2013b).
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